University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers

Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts

2010

“The Tame from the Wild”: handling political
economies of life at the Emergence of capital
Michael R. Griffiths
Rice University, michelg@uow.edu.au

Publication Details
Griffiths, M. R. (2010). “The Tame from the Wild”: handling political economies of life at the Emergence of capital. Humanimalia: a
journal of human/animal interface studies, 1 (2), 1-18.

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au

“The Tame from the Wild”: handling political economies of life at the
Emergence of capital
Abstract

At least since Aristotle, representations of animality in fictions of the economy have skirted the bounds of
allegorical and mimetic modes or (to employ a distinction consonant with the old terms of the Great Chain of
Being) those of analogy and emulation. For Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, animals as living beings must be
consigned to the status of “tame” chattel property. They are also relied upon as the bases for economic
arguments from the “analogy of animals.” Inscriptions of species difference in such arguments often conceal
material origins within genres that appear entirely analogical or allegorical. At times, ironically, scholarly
efforts to address human representations of animals consistently risk reducing the animal to a figment of the
human imaginary even as the gesture that performs this reduction is itself the product of an ethical imperative.
As we all know, the tension between ethics and anthropocentrism has been the subject of much debate in the
burgeoning study of non-human animals. The question has been, to a degree vexed and difficult partly because
the very study of animality automatically questions the foundations of what people think of as ethics. Ethics
then appears as monstrous, but so, too, does the attempt to rethink it beyond the humanist paradigm.
Keywords

political, economies, handling, life, wild, emergence, tame, capital
Disciplines

Arts and Humanities | Law
Publication Details

Griffiths, M. R. (2010). “The Tame from the Wild”: handling political economies of life at the Emergence of
capital. Humanimalia: a journal of human/animal interface studies, 1 (2), 1-18.

This journal article is available at Research Online: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1218

Griffiths: Spring 2010

Page 1 of 18

Volume 1, Number 2 - Spring 2010
Michael R. Griffiths
“The Tame from the Wild”: Handling Political Economies of
Life at the Emergence of Capital
[I]f Socrates makes the women common, and retains private property, the men will
see to the fields, but who will see to the house? . . . it is absurd to argue, from the
analogy of animals, that men and women should follow the same pursuits, for animals
have not to manage a household. — Aristotle, Politics, Bk. II. (1152)
It presently occurr’d to me, that I must keep the tame from the wild . . . and the only
way for this was to have enclosed some Piece of Ground . . . This was a great
Undertaking for one Pair of Hands. — Defoe, Robinson Crusoe (106)
At least since Aristotle, representations of animality in fictions of the economy have skirted the
bounds of allegorical and mimetic modes or (to employ a distinction consonant with the old terms
of the Great Chain of Being) those of analogy and emulation.1 For Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe,
animals as living beings must be consigned to the status of “tame” chattel property. They are also
relied upon as the bases for economic arguments from the “analogy of animals.” Inscriptions of
species difference in such arguments often conceal material origins within genres that appear
entirely analogical or allegorical. At times, ironically, scholarly efforts to address human
representations of animals consistently risk reducing the animal to a figment of the human
imaginary even as the gesture that performs this reduction is itself the product of an ethical
imperative. As we all know, the tension between ethics and anthropocentrism has been the subject
of much debate in the burgeoning study of non-human animals. The question has been, to a degree
vexed and difficult partly because the very study of animality automatically questions the
foundations of what people think of as ethics. Ethics then appears as monstrous, but so, too, does
the attempt to rethink it beyond the humanist paradigm.
For example, during a roundtable discussion held at the 2008 Annual Convention of the Modern
Language Association, entitled “The Future of Animal(ity) Studies,” the conveners provided
panelists with a guiding distinction between animality studies—critique of animal representation
in human discourse—and animal studies, more directly concerned with the materiality of animal
life.2 Although both approaches were taken seriously scholars who identify with the animal studies
side of this distinction have at times been dismissive of the anthropocentrism of animality studies,
as if the risk implied by the analysis of human discourse necessitated a downfall into
anthropocentrism.
Donna Haraway, for instance, has questioned Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of “the
autobiographē of the human species,” arguing that it gives no attention to the material question of
actual animals.3 While it may be the case that critical followers of Derrida’s deconstruction of the
question of the animal risk a reflexive emphasis on humanism, it does not necessarily follow that
address to the animal “outside representation” constitutes the study of a ding an sich beyond the
grasp of anthropocentric discourse.4 I do not point this out in order to suggest that the opening of
recent theoretical analysis onto empirical study of real animals is not valuable. Taking the material
and ethical question of the animal seriously is clearly invaluable. I want to suggest, however, that
the relation between the figural and the material by which living things are made subjects or
objects is more complex than has hitherto been suggested by those who seek, implicitly or
explicitly, to deauthorize the animality studies wing of human-animal studies. In cross-mapping
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fiction, material events, and philosophical discourse, it becomes clear that allegories of animality
are not simply mimetic, though neither are they entirely floating and dereferential. For Richard
Nash, animal discourse forms rather “a pre-existing mythological terminology actually shaped by
preconceptions and hence perceptions by which real beings were observed and recognized by
Europeans” (Wild Enlightenment 3). One could say, for instance, that “real beings” do not preexist enlightenment humanist representational economies with their “mythological terminology.”
The task of disentangling this relation between real and imagined, allegorical and ethically
immediate already opens onto a further double bind, since such a task immediately faces both the
specific historic context of an allegory’s inscription and apparently distinct philosophical and
ethical stakes that inevitably refer to the immediacy of the present.
One sees in my opening epigraphs a distinction between tame and wild animals in Defoe that is
highly reminiscent of Aristotle’s distinction between forms of property in the fields and in the
house—in other words a distinction that crosses the human and the non-human, as well as the
gender, race, and citizen status of the inhabitants of a territory. Such figuration also organizes and
is reorganized by the shifting categorizations of real beings that traverse the overlapping
discourses of taxonomy and political economy. Considering the economic and religious changes
that lead to the rearticulation of these categories, one finds that classical forms of subjection and
economic categorization are both retained and rearticulated within enlightenment humanist
discourse.
In Aristotle’s Politics the taxonomy of living beings schematizes the management of non-living
things in the household and those in the fields—at the farthest reaches of dominion. This “absurd”
analogical praxis continues through the modern era. One key distinction that will be retained in
Britain as late as Daniel Defoe’s 1720s operatively divides chattel property from the family
property system of the landed. The designation of chattel property is never limited to actual
“cattle,” nor is the mysterious space of the house made up only of the family—those inhabiting the
dominion of a pater familius. Such ambivalences in the categorization of life demand multiple
genealogies. Here, my explication of these ambivalences and transformations will be anchored
around a reading of Robinson Crusoe since this text can be read not only as an event in the history
of English literature—for instance, in what Ian Watt has famously called the rise of the novel—but
also in that of political economy.5 Mining Crusoe’s futurity, one easily uncovers numerous
examples of this curious travelogue’s influence on the rhetoric of political economy. Robinson’s
isolation on his island will come to hold a paradigmatic importance for Jean-Jacques Rousseau.6
Marx also famously observed that “Robinson Crusoe’s experiences are a favorite theme with
political economists” (Capital 47). And this is to name but two well known examples.
The advent of Robinson Crusoe in enlightenment intellectual history connects the emergence of
property with that of biopolitics. By referring to the concept of biopolitics in a discussion that
began with Aristotle I mean to invoke Michel Foucault’s famous contention that while “[f]or
millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity
for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living
being in question” (History 144). While such critics as Nash and Phillip Armstrong have
addressed the importance of Robinson Crusoe to the study of non-human animals in
enlightenment discourse, it is life’s transforming place in the discourses of value that I examine in
this essay. While I deploy my argument with reference to contemporary contexts, I aim to
implicate such eighteenth-century animal representation in an emergent biopolitical economy with
a series of ethical and political consequences for the history of the present that concern humans
and non-humans alike. The elusive taxonomy of species and value one finds in Crusoe will remain
all the way to the present, making one aware of the unwieldy basis of the economy of the living
and the non-living, human and non-human, person and thing. Economic allegories of tameness
and wildness cross the species divide and they do so through a concept of property that is always,
on some level, metaphoric. As Gilles Deleuze has argued, for David Hume at least, “nature is the
principle of resemblance and uniformity” produced within the empirical human subject that
emerges at the twilight of the renaissance (Empiricism 47). For Hume it is “property” that
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“engenders and develops inequality” and the rules produced by this regime of property “will be
the object of political economy” (op. cit. 51). Following nineteen years on the heels of Robinson
Crusoe’s first appearance, Hume’s sense that humans are the product of a social constructionism
rooted in property reveals an instance of what Robert Marzec has called the “syndrome” of
Robinson Crusoe as it is carried into the nineteenth- and twentieth-century intensification of the
private.
Nonetheless, since the present essay aims to further far-reaching assertions about the economic
form of life’s subjugation, any risk of anachronism must be explained and defended. I began with
Aristotle because of the strange similarity between his early division of the things of the fields
from those of the house and a division that I will identify in Defoe’s text. Nonetheless classical
economy is not modern capitalism. Animality and slavery are not transcendent Platonic universals
but are produced and reproduced within the discursive structure of a given system of power—what
Foucault called a social apparatus, or dispositif.7 This is to say, that shared schematism does not
apply a historically transcendent biopolitics, but one whose vicissitudes rely (at least in part) on
modern forms of economics, which is to say: the rise of imperialism and capitalism. So, while
invoking a historical comparison, I want to emphasize that I am wary of transplanting the
Aristotelian economy of man, woman, slave, and animal across geographically or temporally
distinct contexts. I prefer to stress the way continuities (as well as breaks) have continually
recurred in economizations of life. Whereas followers of the earlier Foucault have been wary of
the risk of economism, Giorgio Agamben has recently observed that “[t]he Latin term dispositio,
from which [Foucault’s] French term dispositif, or apparatus, derives” also etymologically
connects to the “semantic sphere of the theological oikonomia” (Apparatus 11). The study of
biopolitics can benefit a lot from examining the economics of the dispositif of enlightenment
humanism, its antecedents, and legacy.8
Defoe had manifestly espoused his assent to the connection between economic dominion and the
divine ordering of species difference when he wrote in The Review that without “the subjection . . .
to the useful part of man” of “the useful part of creatures . . . tame, docile, tractable, and
submissive,” humans would be overrun by “the less needful part . . . left wild and at war with
us” (qtd. in Armstrong 44), Were this the case, he asserts, “what would it give to trade, what a
universal stop to all manner of commerce!” (ibid.). As an influential early eighteenth-century
figuration of animal property, Robinson Crusoe reflects and portends shifts in the dispositif by
which forms of life would come to be assigned value in the enlightenment.
Handling Animality and Biopolitics. In making these claims about the intersection of animal
allegory, political economy, and biopolitics through a reading of Defoe’s text, it is necessary to
recall certain recent critiques of humanism that center around the biopolitics of the figural hand
and situate them next to the hand’s place in early eighteenth-century thought. The use of animals
as metaphors for kinds of property has lurked in the margins of a number of recent and influential
critiques of humanism. Derrida famously linked the metaphor of the hand with the epistemology
of the sacrificial structure of enlightenment humanism, or, carnophallogocentrism. In
deconstructive terms, this epistemology of distinction focuses on Heidegger’s retention of the
hand as a mark of humanist thought, particularly à propos the exclusionary potential it retains
within his destruktion of humanist metaphysics.9 Cary Wolfe has argued that the hand in this
philosophical genealogy is but one in a series of signs of species difference.10
Ann Van Sant has argued that Defoe’s subversion of the “hierarchy of head and hand” in Crusoe
reflects the Georgic revolutionary reintroduction of “a long tradition supported by authority from
both Greek and Latin antiquity” (121). Van Sant notes the coincidence in Crusoe’s figural hands
of usages which place Lockean labor alongside exaltations of power and sovereignty. In Van
Sant’s account, the discursive unwieldiness of human social hierarchy exceeds both the
terminology of earlier intra-aristocratic emphasis on status and emergent hierarchies of
socioeconomic class distinction. Van Sant concludes by insisting that the oscillation of the hand
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between categories of difference and hierarchy shows “the persistence of the concept of a statusbased society well after social and economic relations had ceased being governed by status” (132).
However Van Sant’s account does not triangulate these claims about discursive shifts between
class and status with the formation of the human. This is surprising since Derrida, Haraway,
Wolfe, Armstrong, and Nash, in varying ways show animality to be a central enlightenment hinge.
For Derrida, this transformation forms in the late eighteenth century and will root itself in the
phenomenology that follows. “There is,” Derrida remarks, “a Kantian hand, and there will be a
Husserlian hand and a Heideggerian hand . . . which will have traits in common but do not
overlap” (On Touching 149). Bringing Derrida’s contention into dialogue with Van Sant’s, we
could assert that there is also an early-eighteenth century hand that manifests through Locke’s and
Defoe’s texts and connects economics and the body. In light of the Derridean critique of
humanualism, the hand’s privileging of certain labor forms in early eighteenth century economic
thinking entails not only distinctions among human socio-economic categories (class, status), but,
I will argue, traces an emergent nexus of species and race-based differentiations, for which
economic distinctions cannot be disentangled from perceived biological and ontological forms of
life (185).
Recent discussions of biopolitics have emphasized the relation between the body and its
foundational character for modern notions of property. Stressing the corporeal dimensions of
Lockean property, Roberto Esposito points out that the extraction of individualism from a
monotheistic Commonwealth hinges on the foundational coincidence of the body and property.11
Lockean individualism founded in the “property in [one’s] own person,” is corporealized through
its prosthetic mode of extraction—“the labour of [the] body and the work of the hands” (Locke
287). Esposito connects the hand to property through a discussion of Kant’s introduction of
liquidity to political economy via the continued persistence of the figural hand as its support. In
Kant’s conception, property need not be literally held in hand in order to be individualized—that
is, justified as an individual possession. For Kant, the hand’s absenting from direct connection to
property becomes the underpinning of moveable goods and of the pecuniary by extension
(Esposito 69). Since, as Van Sant has argued, Defoe’s text subverts the primacy of mental over
manual labor, Defoe’s text must also reposition the conditions under which beings are made the
subjects of power. However, as revealing as it is, the biopolitical character of political economy,
and the status of animal bodies is not apparent within the textual trajectory that Esposito traces
from Locke to Kant. Through a semiotics of animality’s relation to the hand and body of the
sovereign, Defoe’s text repositions Lockean notions of sovereignty, property, and liberty. It
behooves one to note that the relative tameness of animals, as well as the relatively economic
practices of non-Europeans was initially subject to the relative ability or inability of Europeans to
show sympathy to other forms of life. As Deleuze notes, sympathy is not a phenomenological
given but, as was recognized by Defoe’s eighteenth-century contemporary, Hume, takes form
according to the social apparatus that produces it, which is to say at that time, political economy
(Empiricism 37-54). As Hume further emphasized, “society is in the beginning a collection of
families” (op. cit. 39).
Production: Pecuniary Chattels and the Figure of the Goat. As Armstrong has suggested, the
preponderant influence of Cartesian thought meant that European travelers normatively assumed
that non-humans and non-Europeans alike could not easily be grasped conceptually. However they
could certainly be grasped and commodified via the hand of homo oeconomicus (17-22). The
incarceration of life by the “Hand” is always already an act of detention, as at the moment when,
“in a great undertaking for one Pair of Hands,” Crusoe breeds up a “He-Goat . . . tame as one of
the Kids . . . to supply myself with Goat-Flesh . . . [so] perhaps I might have them about my House
like a Flock of Sheep”(RC 106). Kant’s detentio is property without the necessity of possession,
whereby “I possess it, although I have laid it out of my hand, and wherever it may lie” (Armstrong
13). Crusoe’s detention of his goats anticipates Kant’s humanualist assertion, showing the reliance
of early colonial adventures on this humanist political economy of the confinement of nonhumans.
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Shortly after enclosing his goats in this way, Crusoe steps back to survey the order of his kingdom
of non-human subjects, remarking on his status as his “Majesty the Prince and Lord of the whole
Island” (RC 108). He then begins to enumerate the roles of the various subjects around his table:
Poll, [Crusoe’s parrot] as if he had been my Favourite, was the only one permitted to
talk to me. My Dog who was now grown very old and crazy, and had found no
Species to multiply his Kind upon, sat always at my Right Hand, and two Cats, one
on one Side the Table and one on the other, expecting now and then a Bit from my
Hand, as a Mark of special Favour. (RC 108)
Where are the goats once Crusoe and his “little family sit down to dinner” (RC108)? Where are
the goats whom Crusoe has painstakingly bred and housed—beginning with the first Kid whom he
“sav’d” alive from his “Dog” (RC 81, 105-107)? What is the meaning of the absence of cattle—
and therefore, chattel—animals from this scene of a family made up entirely of non-humans? As
Armstrong notes, only the first goat finds itself in the family circle (41). Crusoe takes pity only on
the first exceptional goat which “became so loving, so gentle, so fond, that is became . . . one of
my Domesticks also” (RC 82).
One can identify the liminal statuses of the animals in Crusoe’s dominion by noting historical and
biographical resonances, for instance, the connection between Crusoe and his “real-life avatar,
Alexander Selkirk,” a castaway who was rescued from Juan Fernàndez Island several years prior
to the publication of Defoe’s book (Armstrong 13). Yet the mimetic sources for Crusoe are an
explanatory means and not an exhaustive end. Selkirk, who according to the first published
account of him “tam’d some wild Goats and Cats”(RC 230)—was doubtless a source for Defoe.
But, as Nash puts it, “beyond the already well-travelled ground of the Selkirk-Crusoe affinity,” the
implications of the interspecies castaway narrative can be deciphered through reading practices
beyond the biographical and mimetic. Since “both islands and their animal populations
(particularly goats) carry special significance” for enlightenment models of economy and
taxonomy (Nash 67). As Nash reminds us, “[t]he goats that populated Selkirk’s island refuge, and
which Crusoe domesticates, represented in eighteenth-century natural history a liminal creature
between wild and tame, savage and domestic” (87).
The solitary human at table, Crusoe excitedly observes, “How like a King I din’d” (RC 116). This
performance of sovereignty over his little family follows the goat’s domestication and the
banishment of its offspring to the compound.12 The narrative trail left by goats in Defoe’s text
leads back to the earliest classical division of dominion—between the things of the family and
those of the fields.13 As Ian A. Bell observes, Lockean thought of dominion conditions Defoe’s
figuration of Crusoe’s sovereignty. The etymology of dominion finds its root in domus, the home.
In the Leviathan, Hobbes reinvigorated the connection between dominion and property, insisting
that: “[t]hat which in speaking of goods and possessions is called an owner, and in Latin dominus .
. . The Right of possession, is called Dominion” (218). If one foregrounds the slippage between
the microscopic family dominion of Crusoe’s experiment, and the impersonal connection with
territory over which the sovereign casts his gaze, we arrive at an aporia that fails to manageably
separate Crusoe’s paternal power over property and his Sovereign power—the wider sense of
Dominion.
As was the case for Aristotle, in Defoe’s allegory dominion, sovereignty, and paternal power are
not discrete but are rather connected by a metonymic displacement. As Michel Foucault rightly
notes, the metaphoric relation between family and state will come to recede into a custodial power
over subjects, which, in Defoe’s allegory, are non-human.14 Bell argues that while Friday is called
a slave, his relation to Crusoe also borders on the status of an autonomous subject. In Robinson
Crusoe, the goat functions as the prototype for the chattel slave whose value is coincident with its
conditions of life.15 This is why the first captured kid must be nursed: made to live by the
sovereign rather than let die in order to be rendered manageable (RC 105).16 Not only is the goat
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taxonomically liminal, it is immediately connected to Europe’s outside, “the proliferating goats . .
. [call] out for the civilizing touch of European cultivation” (Nash 83). As Alfred Crosby notes,
Spanish, Portugese, and English maritime travelers used Atlantic islands as stations for
replenishment in the long voyages to the New World and around the Cape of Good Hope. For this
reason, these explorers made a practice of seeding these islands with familiar species, for instance
in the Canaries, as they conquered each isle “[t]hey ‘Europeanized’ their island, importing species
of Old World plants and animals” (Crosby 94). As Nash argues by reference to William
Dampier’s journal, “in the various accounts that inform Defoe’s narrative, European species (rats,
cats, and goats in particular) explode on Juan Fernàndez” (Nash 79), to figure the global
replication “of versions of Europe” (Crosby 89).
The carnophallogocentric structure in Derrida’s sense emerges in the logic of slave and chattel
subjectivity—a metaphorics of consumption troubled by this Gordian Knot of parallel
subjugations. Before he has fully tamed and nursed his Kid in the realm of res familius, Crusoe
asks God’s blessing for this meat he has placed his labor upon through hunting—recalling the
primal scene of non-European (“Indian”) labor in Locke’s Second Treatise (RC 91).17 Crusoe
rhetorically invokes the tension between individualism and commonwealth, asking “[c]an God
spread a Table in the Wilderness?” (RC 94). Such ritual expenditure begins to take on an
increasingly outmoded role in the novel, as Crusoe better encloses his land and fixes the property
forms designating the subjects in his compound. Prior to Friday’s emergence as “slave,” the
“Savage People who sometimes haunted this Island” produce for Crusoe the specter of
humanualist economy’s primitive other through “Print of a Man’s Foot” (RC 126). In response to
the foot, Crusoe immediately accelerates his handy work of enclosing his compound, “that I might
not fall into the Hands of the barbarians” (RC 125). The attempt at global self-replication that
Crosby identifies with early modern European expansion can also be read in Derrida’s terms as
the “globalatinization” of religious and economic thought of property (Cosmopolitanism 32).
This cross-cultural Christianization of economy recalls the degree to which, as Agamben noted,
Foucault’s narrative of the emergence of apparatuses of subjection is closely connected to the
“theological oikonomia” in monotheistic logics of economy. In more recently translated writings
on biopolitics, Foucault connects such apparatuses of control over life as the science of population
with the rise of capitalism. For the later Foucaultian genealogy, the sovereign’s direct connection
to the wealth of the state recedes, yet his power over his subjects functions increasingly through
the management of subjects via population modeling—a form of power consonant with the
emergent imperative to avoid the direct governance of markets.18 As property becomes private, it
refuses the common logic that referred to the divinely guaranteed sovereign. Yet sovereignty’s
multiplication of biopolitical projects nonetheless refers to its subjects as forms of life with
economic potential.
In the Politics, Aristotle distinguishes such instruments of production as the sowing shuttle—
which facilitates a limited number of tasks—from instruments of action. Aristotle designates the
“slave” a living possession, capable of instrumentality but possessed of potential to act only qua
instrument (BW 1135-37). What Aristotle withholds from the slave is not potential [potenza], but
the dynamic form of potential [dynameia]. For this reason, Aristotle says the slave has no
autonomy: no capacity for reflective action. The distribution of kinds of property relies at once on
their spatial orientation—whether through detentio or in proximity to the hand—and the related
division of forms of life by their varying potentials.
Defoe’s text stands at the hinge of the two key breaks in Foucault’s genealogy. Crusoe is at once
sovereign of a kingdom—guarantor of the wellbeing of his subjects—and father in dominion of
these same subjects, their direct owner. Crusoe’s goats display neither dynamic potential, nor the
related autonomy ascribed to companions like the parrot. Crusoe’s cats, as I have said, receive the
expenditure of “special favours” from his hand, while nonetheless remaining simultaneously
subjects and property. Yet these little things of the family are not property in the sense Aristotle
ascribed to a sowing-shuttle, nor are they mere instruments of use and exchange. The absent goats
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are more particularly chattel property than the difficulty to classify cats, who receive special favor,
or the parrot who speaks.19 Defoe’s sacrificial economy renders the goat a “living Magazine of
Flesh, Milk, Butter and Cheese” (RC 111). Following Derrida, we might say that the
carnophallogocentric structure of consumption and sacrifice is allegorized through the goat’s
reduction to a “living magazine.” The liminal taxonomic status with which the goats are shackled
foregrounds not only the limits Nash saw in eighteenth-century natural history, but also limits in
the related rethinking of property’s mobility.
As it is figured in Crusoe, such globalatinization of the sacrificial economy is a reiteration of the
Aristotelian distinction between domestic and agrarian property, which forms a basic tenet in
Roman Law through the distinction between res familia and res pecunia. For Marcel Mauss the
Roman economics of “things” was subject to a binary based on a primary spatial distinction that
founds roman law (nomos).20The material resonance of the distribution of animality in space is
clear for the nature of the distinction wherein “things were of two kinds. A distinction was made
between familia and pecunia, between the things of the household . . . and the cattle subsisting in
the fields, far from the stables” (Mauss 49). For Locke, the hand facilitated property grounded in
the body’s immediate labor—“the work of the hands.” But Crusoe’s initial work of enclosure, he
has established the detentio of the goats, which renders them movable property no longer reliant
on the hand. Through the manual, Crusoe facilitates the feeding of the bit to cats, the “mark of
special favor.” In approaching animals, manual labor is something from which the master of
dominion is increasingly removed. We can find the same logic in the Roman legal system from
which it is derived:
A distinction was also made between the res mancipi and the res nec mancipi,
according to the forms of sale. As regards the former, which are made up of precious
things, including immovable goods and even children, no disposal of them could take
place save according to the precepts of the mancipatio, the ‘taking (capere) in hand . .
. The things that did not fall under the mancipatio are precisely the small livestock in
the fields and the pecunia, money, the idea, word and form of which derived from
cattle and sheep. (49-50)
The res familia creatures most properly inhabit the proprietary sphere of the house, where the
goats enclosed in the compound are pecunia creatures: a “living magazine” capable of producing
further fungible goods. Within Crusoe’s dominion, but banished from his family dinner, the goats
can be owned without being in proximity of the hand and can be exchanged readily and fungibly.
Crusoe’s goats are both res pecunia and res nec mancipatio.
Within this order, the goat is not born, but made pecuniary by “the work of Hands.” Afterward,
the hand becomes an increasingly symbolic mechanism of labor. If we continue to take Robinson
Crusoe as at once an allegorical musing on forms of animal property and an event in the history of
political economy, then the vicissitudes of the goat foreground the text’s exemplification of this
initial proprietary distinction in the state of nature (where, as Marx points out, exchange is always
potential) (Marx 47-50). Crusoe’s domination of goats allegorizes the transformation of forms of
life—be they goats, or slaves—into forms of property. As such, Goats must be made immobile
and incapable of escape, ironically in order for them to become the most dispensable (and
therefore mobile) instantiation of living property. Towards the end of Crusoe’s diary, he notes:

Dec. 27. Kill’d a young Goat, and lam’d another so as that I catch’d it, and led it
Home in a string; when I had it Home, I bound and splinter’d up its Leg which was
broke, N. B. I took such care of it, that it liv’d, and the Leg grew well, and as strong
as ever; but by my nursing it so long it grew tame, and fed upon the little Green at my
Door, and would not go away: This was the first time that I entertain’d a Thought of
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breeding up some tame creatures, that I might have Food when my Powder and Shot
was all spent. (RC 56)
Within the structure of narration the first goat on the island is rendered chattel and pecunia
through the nursing function of Crusoe’s hands, even as this function also carries out the laming of
the animal to prevent its escape. Res pecunia is a structural position within which potential for
instrumentality is attained through the sovereign’s custodial adaptation of the health and wellbeing
of the body. By the time of the dinner of Crusoe’s “little family,” this process has progressed to
facilitate the absence of the goats from his grasp.
Reproduction is crucial to this process of rendering life subject to exchange. Crusoe’s final act “of
conjuring” in relation to his island is to send wives back from England to his pagan subjects.21
Some animals can be bred, others cannot. Crusoe’s dog, for instance, the not-quite-companion, is
to die without progeny. The goats, on the other hand, are capable of producing useful
exchangeable offspring. The production of such pecuniary items by the husbandry of goats is also
necessary to the luxurious feast at the house—its enabling condition. Shortly after Crusoe has, for
the “first time . . . entertain’d a Thought of breeding up some tame Creatures,” he writes in his
diary, “Jan. 3. I began my Fence or Wall; which being still jealous of my being attack’d by some
Body, I resolved to make very thick and strong” (RC 76). Despite the apparent absence of other
humans, Crusoe’s act of breeding goats necessarily entails the effective origination of enclosed
land but not all of Crusoe’s experiments with the breeding of living subjects proceed as efficiently.
Consumption and the Family: Domesticating the Cat. Describing his little family’s history, the
castaway introduces the strange pedigree of the cats:
The two Cats which I brought on Shore at first . . . were both of them dead, and had
been interr’d near my Habitation by my own Hand; but one of them . . . multiply’d by
I know not what Kind of Creature . . . [T]wo which I had preserv’d tame, whereas the
rest run wild in the Woods, and became indeed troublesome to me at last. (RC 108)
Where the goats refer to a pecuniary system of exchange, the cats refer to a confused religious
economy. Each animal codes a different aspect of the globalatinization, in Derrida’s terms, of
economic forms. As Mauss notes, the etymology of the notion of res familia implies a privileged
category of life where ownership is linked to gift-giving and religious sacrifice. Mauss observes
that the survival of the sacral principle of the gift is coded in the etymology of the Latin word res
(thing).22 The same Roman Legal form is preserved in the European feudal property system of
domination and sovereignty:
the nexum, the most ancient form of contract in Roman law, is already separated from the
substance of collective contracts and also from the ancient system of gifts that commit one…
Things [according to this conception of nexum] are not the inert objects that the law of Justinian
and our own legal systems conceive them to be. First they form part of the family: the Roman
familia includes the res, and not only people . . . The best etymology of the word familia is
without a doubt that which compares it to the Sanskrit dhaman, “house.” (Mauss 49)
Thus, the family and its things were afforded a privileged place in the domestic space of the
Roman nexum. Similarly, Crusoe’s domestic creatures possess, if not subjective autonomy, a
privileged symbolic relation to the master through their very poverty of instrumentality: the parrot
who speaks, the dog who sits at one’s right hand, the luxuriating cats who receive the “special
favor” of the sovereign’s “Hand” a ‘Bit’ now and then.
In Locke’s terms, the body’s relationship with property is a human universal. The “Indian” is as
capable of extracting property from Commonwealth as the Christian European, since “the Law of
reason makes the Deer, that Indian’s who killed it” (Locke 306). The marker of cultural difference
between “the Indian” and the European parallels that already established between the subjects of
res familia—figured by the domesticated allegorical cats, dogs, and parrots—and the absented
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pecuniary goats. This marker is waste, where “as much as any one can make use of to any
advantage of life before it spoils” is thereby that person’s property (op. cit. 308). Although
“nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy,” any waste is simultaneously a sacrilege
and a violation of the principles of emergent capitalism—whose economics computes only use
and exchange. What Mauss shows in this rethinking is that the secular nexum divides forms of life
into familial and “inert” pecuniary objects and that this process also facilitates modernity’s
separation of religion and economy.
In the history of privacy’s emergence in England and for English Imperialism abroad, one can say
that what Marzec calls the syndrome of Robinson Crusoe changes with the changing status of the
tithe. Tithing, the Christian remnant of sacral waste, was in diminution through the seventeenth
century emplotted by Crusoe’s fictive memoir. As Laura Brace has argued, in the latter half of the
seventeenth-century:
debates between the advocates of enclosure and the defenders of commons centered
on conflicting notions of property. [D]isentangling the fusion of economic, cultural
and religious concerns, [the] opposition [to enclosure] focused on the improvers’ ideal
of using the land to its utmost worth. They felt that this reflected a dangerous abuse of
the common treasury and ran counter to God’s purposes … God was in control of the
land itself rather than interested in its fruits and productivity. (Brace 78)
Nonetheless, it was the improver’s logic that became the norm for the economic individualism that
would be espoused by the globalizing English church. The narrative by which Defoe renders his
goats a signifier of res pecunia also allegorizes the transformation and enclosure of land in late
seventeenth century England. The dynamic of Crusoe’s family at dinner permits useless
expenditure only as a sign of sovereignty. This contradictory and covert retention of sacral
expenditure will not be articulated until the twentieth century postulation of a gift exchange by
Mauss or that of a general economy by Georges Bataille. Where, for Marx, enclosure signals only
the emergence of private property, Crusoe’s “living magazine of Flesh” produces an
individualizing function of privacy; this function operates through the sacrifice of life.23 The
Christian logic of sacrifice was replaced through the late seventeenth and early eighteen centuries
by new forms of non-productive circulation: the European commodity trade in luxuries and the
credit economy. Crusoe’s cats refer to this transformation and by metonymic association
complicate the figure of the “hand” in enlightenment economies of human exceptionalism.24
“God gave the World to Men in Common,” Locke recounts, “but since he gave it them for their
benefit, and the greatest Conveniences of Life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be
supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated” (Locke 309). Yet the
Indian’s very mode of life is rendered intrinsically wasteful by a process of comparison within the
logic of use and exchange which Locke has gradually been adopting. Since “an acre of land that
bears here Twenty bushels of Wheat, and another in America, which, with the same husbandry,
would do the like, are without a doubt, of the same natural intrinsick Value,” then Locke deduces
that the appropriation of land from savages should logically follow (op. cit. 316). “[I]f,” Locke
rejoins, “all the Profit an Indian received from it were to be valued and sold here . . . it would
scarcely be worth any thing.” In this way, the secularization of European economics parallels the
“civilization” of the colonized. Crusoe’s goats figure enclosure in Europe and abroad. As such
they figure the extraction of surplus value from the forms of life that populated enclosing
commons of the imperial center which, as Crosby observes, were being transplanted to its new
colonial domain. Equally they figure the insistence upon secular economy to which such figures of
the sacral as Friday’s people—like Locke’s Indian—finds themselves subject. Taking a Bit from
Crusoe’s “Hand” as a mark of “special favour,” the animals of Crusoe’s little family stand for the
economic unwieldiness, which remains at the heart of the enclosing metropole.25 With the
diminution of tithing in England, the sacral connotations of economics that still subsist within res
familius undergo an alternate purge that sees them transformed into alternate economic forms. As
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Carolyn Merchant argues, “enclosure represented for the English the most prevalent method of
entering the market economy” (qtd. in Nash 80).
Crusoe’s first encounter with animals is the discovery of a wild cat seated atop a chest recovered
from the doomed vessel. “I found,” he says,

no Sign of any Visitor, only there sat a Creature like a wild Cat upon one of the
Chests . . . I toss’d her a Bit of Bisket, tho’ by the Way I was not very free of it, for
my Store was not great: However, I spar’d her a Bit, I say, and she went to it, smell’d
of it, and ate it, and look’d (as pleas’d) for more, but I thanked her, and could spare no
more; so she march’d off. (RC 41)
The “wild Cat” is fed a “Bit of Bisket” that should not be spared by the frugal Protestant
colonialist. As I have argued, the feeding of the wild cat can be read as a sacrifice unjustifiable
either in the emergent discourse of political economy or in any extant practice of the English
Church. Where this exuberant expenditure could be thought in Bataille’s terms, it could
contemporaneously have allegorized only the threat of either savage religion or popery. The store
not being “very free of it” marks a curious exception in an allegory that plays out through the
thrifty enclosure of this wild island.26 In certain colonial English dialects, from at least 1607, the
word Bit could connote a number of kinds of coin, by

the eighteenth century the bit was generally the old Mexican real [equivalent] of a
dollar or about 6d. sterling; later values assigned are a half pistareen or of a dollar,
and (in some colonies) the value of 1d. sterling.27
The signifier bit, then, while denoting a scrap of food in the both the early wild Cat scene and the
scene at dinner can also be read to connote coin in this way: at the horizon of what, for the
dictionary’s compilers, is a parenthesized emergent colonialism.28 In concert with the Bit, Crusoe's
familial feline subjects gradually transform themselves into figures of luxury exchange.
The figural pack of cats can be endlessly unpacked, so to speak. Theodore F.M. Newton first
reconstructed Defoe’s abortive attempt to avoid debtor’s prison in 1692 by entering business as a
civet farmer. A reference to Defoe in a Bankrupts Bill of 1706, reads: “He has run through the
degrees of Comparison, Pos. as a Hosier; Compar. as a Civet-Cat Merchant; and Super. as a
Pantile Merchant” (ctd. in Newton 10). Civets were a luxury item whose glands excreted a
“buttery oil” from which could be produced “the base of a well-known perfume” (op. cit., 12-13).
This was then “packed in bullock horns and shipped to the perfumers of Europe and America,”
and, as Newton asserts, “there was a ready market for such an elixir” (op. cit. 10). Defoe’s
apparent history with Civet Cats provides another way to read the connection of the figural cats to
luxury trade, a fascinating context in light of the contemporary credit-driven economy that
produced the South Seas Bubble of 1720. It also proffers an alternate way to read the furious
breeding of the mad pack of cats on the Island that Crusoe cannot explain. The biographical
resonance of Defoe’s own failed scheme to farm civet cats foregrounds luxury economics as the
hinge between familiar European markets and the emergent global trade. As Armstrong argues
“interbreeding between the ship’s cats and wild animals suggests their common origins [from]
European ships” (35). The cats that Crusoe pays “special favor” to at table through a “bit” from
his sovereign “Hand” are the hybrid offspring of European cats run wild in the colonial dominion
of Crusoe’s making. In this way, the globalization of useless expenditure is both an export of
European mercantilism that this project represses and an invention specific to the colonial project.
Feeding the cats figures the necessity of investing liquid capital in luxury goods that—like civet
cats—are themselves immutably fungible. Crusoe’s transformation of the island may suggest the
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need for frugal husbandry and enclosure as a prerequisite to the sovereign enjoyment of
domination. It also functions to compensate for the violence done to the goats, who become
themselves an export of the European self.29
As Brace argues, the diminution of the practice of tithing is a sign of the reduction of religious
sacrifice as it inversely corresponds to the increasing enclosure of common lands. The cats emerge
as a hybrid excess of the erasure of the Christian sacral. In relegating this excess to Europe’s
outside, Crusoe’s cats mark the simultaneous outside to the emergent Protestant ethic via their
connotation of the economics of excess and ritual and this, in turn, is figured through European
and non-European others. In this light, we can begin to see the economic rationale (however
irrational) of othered practices of excessive consumption that loom large in Defoe’s account, like
cannibalism—one of Defoe’s key motivations for enclosing his compound (to avoid the “Hands”
of savages and barbarians).
While the tithe was consistently associated with the despised practices of the papacy, Defoe
appears more concerned with the regulation of non-Christian forms than with fear of Popery.30
Like the figural wildness of the cats, this feared religious alterity is to be managed through the
hand—a manual metaphorics. In the Further Adventurers of Robinson Crusoe Crusoe happily
joins with a Papist against the greater evil of the island’s new population of “Spaniards” who
“were the main Body of the [island’s] Family” but have neglected to baptize their “savage” wives
(1). In the Further Adventures the papist’s solution for ensuring the civilization of the island and
of its place in Christendom is to “take the work out of the Hands” of Crusoe’s hybrid populace of
savages, Spaniards, and wayward Englishmen (23). Before savages and “Idolaters” can corrupt
them, the papist insists Crusoe should, “teach them the knowledge of the true God.” Here the
“Hand” connects labor and proselytism at the foundation of commonwealth—indeed of pastoral
care more generally. The metaphorics of the hand frames this categorization of people into forms
of life wherein the pastoral actor in the wilds of foreign possessions is rewarded for his
proselytizing efforts by the guarantee of future dominion. Pleased with his good works, Crusoe
later notes, “it is a valuable thing indeed, to be an instrument in God’s Hand to convert seven and
thirty Heathens to the knowledge of Christ” (26; emphasis added). In celebration for the
sovereign’s return, Crusoe’s subjects roast five goat Kids (9). In the Crusoe fictions, the hand
itself is refused manumission by its ongoing role in the economics of pastoral care from goat to
slave to subject. Defoe’s reconciliation of labor and providence through metaphors of species
property. Between the cat, the goat, and the hand that divides and binds them, figurations of
animality and difference reveal the complementary emergences of economic subjection, religious
transformation, and the taxonomy of life.
Cat-astrophe. Since I opened through Aristotle, it would do to temporarily return to the classical
politics in order to ground the discussion. In the Poetics “the king” must be “the natural superior
of his subjects” even as the subjects of his sovereign protection must also be “of the same kin and
kind” as he (BW 1143). In order to be exchangeable, chattel beings like Crusoe’s goats are
arbitrarily removed from the family, that is, from the status of kin. Yet in Defoe’s fiction the goats
are the offspring of the first tame goat, which, we saw, became one of Crusoe’s “domesticks.” In
narrativizing this paradox, Defoe’s “analogy of animals” succeeds in narrating the modern form of
political subordination with precision. The goat Kid, like Friday are the first and most familiar
creatures in a process of defamiliarization that estrange their offspring (which are clearly “of the
same kin and kind”) to the status of inert possessions. In Crusoe, as I have argued, secular modern
narratives of sovereignty and economy retain a metaphorics of descent and familiarity which
thoroughly retains the residues of Christian individualism, even as they are converted into new
symbolic forms.
The taxonomy of exchangeable creatures that inhabits Defoe’s allegory portends the
interdependence of biopolitical technologies in the modern global economy. In this newly
reconstituted global nexum the form under which life is rendered property is politically central.
These indeterminacies are foreshadowed by Defoe’s fiction, which has proven both influential and
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prophetic. Animality and race mutually constitute the property form of the emergent global order
dominated by first world capital. Here I want to signal some of the implications of the preceding
examination of the figural animal economies in Crusoe, as they imply the emergence of this
biopolitical property form of under modernity.
Not until twentieth century engagements with non-European economies did the contradictions of
Lockean and other English moral and political thought become clear. Bataille, for instance,
famously argued that individualism—which he called sovereignty—is grounded in the
transcendence of the human soul even as this soul is contradictorily grounded in an irreducibly
animal body.31 More recently, Esposito asserts that a kind of quasi-religious transcendence
continues covertly as the enabling of that least politically questioned category of person-hood. For
Esposito, the “dispositif of the person” describes the inextricable religious and economic structure
of individuation that operates in concert with the humanist paradigm. In the aporia between the
human body and the horizon of transcendence lies the “person” whose dispositif “superimposes
and juxtaposes humans as men and animals as men; or that distinguishes a part of man that is truly
human from another that is bestial, that is enslaved to the first.”32 Esposito argues, “to be able to
legitimately assert what we call subjective rights (at least in the modern juridical conception of
rights), one needs beforehand to have penetrated the enclosed space of the person” (1), the
economic connotations of which should by now be immediately apparent. In bestowing and
retracting familial status on the various beings in his dominion, Crusoe’s narrative acts out this
tension between the possession of an “enclosed” personhood and the capacity to assert the
protection and obligation of fellow beings. As an economic category that evades even the old legal
reliance on embodiment the dispositif of the “person” remains in political operation even after
humanist discourse claims to have extricated itself from its problematic race and gender biases.
Within this dispositif, animals are hardly people too, to be sure. They are beings who rely on
protections that citizens of the first world, as enclosed and enclosing persons, are immunized from
affording them. I say first world citizens because it is not only non-human life (though this is
categorically the case), but humans themselves who are affected by the contradictory production
of personhood. It does not suffice to be a human in order to be treated as a person: a living being
subject to sympathy and obligation. The modern form of pecuniary capital and the secular
taxonomy of living property developed in the eighteenth-century can be seen as the beginning of
the dispositif of the person for the Imperialist project of England and, to some degree, the models
that it is produced in its wake.
The hand remains a central figure in this relation. For Esposito, “figures of manumissio and
mancipatio [are] unequalled in their capacity for coercison and creative flights.”33 The hand of the
sovereign individual permits a continuity between the granting of the status of protection and
partial freedom to others [manumissio] and the correlative form of possession and release with its
connotation of economic proprietary [mancipatio]. Esposito draws out this partiality through its
classical prehistory in Roman citizenship.34 But, as I have argued, the partiality of political
subjectivity and its relation to the economization of sympathy is reorganized in the early
eighteenth-century through allegorizations like that of the European traveller’s encounter with the
non-human and the non-European. As I noted earlier (via Deleuze) it was Hume who first openly
observed this emergent contradiction—as early as 1739.35 The initial model of the moral
framework of obligation for Hume is the affective dimension of the family (Deleuze 39). As a
conceptual tool for thinking society, Deleuze notes, families “exclude one another; they are partial
(partiales) rather than made up of parts (partielles). The parents of one family are always the
strangers of other families . . . The problem of society, in this sense, is not a problem of limitation,
but a problem of integration.” The problem is that this enlightenment social logic of moral
philosophy, like the Roman law from which it descends, does not contain a mechanism for
inclusion. Like Crusoe’s compound, the English enlightenment’s model for sympathetic
engagement with alterity in the sphere of politics and economy is mired in contradictory
familiatories and favoritisms. This dynamic of differentiation emphasizes corporeal care over
sovereignty as the general condition of a familiar or recognizable personhood: whose hidden
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condition is the appearance of civilization. This is apparent insofar as it invades so many even
well intentioned models of ethics and politics.36
In the neocolonial order which Crusoe’s island nation-building portends the citizens find
themselves consistently at risk of animalization.37 It is this risk of reduction to the status of virtual
chattel, the relegation to the pecuniary position within the global dominion that traverses the
category of human and animal in the dispositif of the person. Being a person within the secular
public sphere of today’s global order still requires that one perform an enclosed, frugal
individualism that, insofar as what Derrida calls globalatinization defines this order, remains
Abrahamic. As Jean Joseph Goux notes, limning Bataille’s failure to penetrate capitalist society,
“[p]roductive expenditure now entirely dominates social life. In a desacralized world, where
human labor is guided in the short or long term by the imperative of utility, the surplus has lost its
meaning” (208). The emergence of this person, immunized of all that is objectionable to the
Abrahamic legacy coincides with the emergence of a politics for which the rational participation
of reflective subjects as its basis. As Partha Chatterjee has recently argued, politics today
“emphasizes the welfare and protection of populations . . . using similar technologies all over the
world but largely independent of considerations of active participation by citizens in the
sovereignty of the state” (47).
The problem with the political economic legacy of the Robinsonade is not only that the rational
public sphere has not lived up to its egalitarian project but it is also that the neocolonialist
architects of this global island continue to believe that it has. The tense relation between the
familial and the pecuniary, between the kin and the essentially other, between the potential person
and a “living magazine of flesh”—each of these early modern binaries pre-empts what Judith
Butler identifies in the twenty-first century as “indefinite detention,” to which we all remain
potentially subject. 38
Notes
Revision of this essay was precipitated with support from the Shirley Bard Rapoport Graduate
Essay Prize.
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developments in my thinking. Josh Kitching also deserves warm acknowledgement for his
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reference, this also implies a thoroughgoing skepticism of the temporality reified in historicist and
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Dispositif of the Person,” Trans. Tim Campbell. Forthcoming in Law, Culture, and the
Humanities. (2010): MS 1–21.
8. On the connection between post-Marxist thought, biopolitics, and caveats for the conjugation of
Gramscian terminologies with an adaptation of Agamben, see Laclau, “Bare Life or Social
Indeterminacy,” in Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life. Ed. Matthew Calarco and Stephen De
Caroli. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007, 11-22.
9. cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, 63-4. Cary Wolfe has argued that the hand is one in a series of
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a systems-theoretical register. Cary Wolfe, “In the Shadow of Wittgenstein’s Lion: Language,
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2d. 1989.
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man’s self conscious apprehension of his own conditions. Marx, Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts of 1844, 111-3.
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volume of Capital. Clearly I do not intend to take umbrage with the notion that enclosure reform
results in the simultaneous emergence of privacy and alienation. Rather, as I have been arguing,
this contention must analyzed in relation to the subjection of life. Marx, Capital, 369.
24. cf. Haraway. When Species Meet, 165.
25. Nash has discussed eighteenth-century animal nomenclature and Poll’s status as mimetic being
at length in his “Animal Nomenclature,” 107-8. Armstrong discusses Poll’s speech in terms of
Lockean and Cartesian models of consciousness in What Animals Mean, 18-21.
26. This is no doubt a consequence of the influence of Max Novak’s admittedly brilliant analysis
of the correspondence between Locke and Robinson Crusoe and the effects the latter was to
produce subsequently. Novak rightly argues that Crusoe narrativizes the emergence of utility in
such an isolated situation as a distant island. Novak also discusses Marx’s argument that exchange
is presupposed even in such conditions, as I have earlier remarked, in Novak, Economics and the
Fiction of Daniel Defoe, 54-59.
27. Bit. n. 1608 {emem} Belm. Lond. III. 122 Coiners..vulgus, Bit-makers. In the eighteenth
century the bit was generally the old Mexican real value of a dollar or about 6d. sterling; later
values assigned are a half pistareen or of a dollar, of a dollar, and (in some colonies) the value of
1d. sterling. (Gomes Cassidy and Brock Le Page 44)
28. What I here call “parenthetical colonialism” conjugates an important dialogue that animal
studies might pursue with such a postcolonialist as Joseph, who points out that “[f]eminist critique
of mainstream historiography has revealed that when the subject of history is normatively male,
sexual difference appears as an agent of historical causation.” One might add to Joseph’s fine
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point the observation that when the subject of history is carnally male, sexual difference appears
as the erasure of gift exchange, for instance at the moment when “Defoe’s Roxana (1724) stages
the self-constitution of its female protagonist against the background of British commercial
expansion.” Reading the East India Company, 4, 32.
29. The wild Cat’s gendering as a “she” can also be read as a resonance of contemporary
figurations of non-productive economies as feminine, for instance in the satirical image of “Dame
Credit.” Kimberly S. Latta, “The Mistress of the Marriage Market: Gender and Economic
Ideology in Defoe’s Review,” in ELH 69:2 (2002): 359-83.
30. cf. Brace, Idea of Property, 76-80.
31. cf. Bataille, Theory of Religion. New York: Zone Books, 1989.
32. Roberto Esposito, “For a Philosophy of the Impersonal,” Trans. Timothy Campbell,
forthcoming in Centennial Review, (2010): MS 1–15, 9. Citations are from the manuscript
pagination. The translator has given permission for these citations.
33. Esposito, “The Dispositif of the Person,” Trans. Tim Campbell. Forthcoming in Law, Culture,
and the Humanities (2010): MS 1–21, 11.Citations are from the manuscript pagination. The
translator has given permission for these citations.
34. Esposito notes that “no one in Rome was a full-fledged person from the beginning of life nor
did one remain a person forever,” limning not only ancient forms of slavery, but also the transition
from fili to patres, and other transformations in age, class, condition, property ownership that
variously transformed the relation between life and citizenship in the classical scene. Esposito,
“The Dispositif of the Person,” 11.
35. cf. David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon, 2007.
36. Esposito has in mind here, for instance, the way the Utilitarian philosophy of life espoused
most famously by as Peter Singer, “unambiguously accept[s] the Roman doctrine of the initial
distinction between person and non-person, through the intermediate stages of the quasi-person,
the semi-person and the temporary person.” Esposito, “For a Philosophy of the Impersonal,” 9.
37. cf. Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 2001, 27-8, 2358.
38. cf. Judith Butler, Precarious Life: Powers of Mourning and Violence. New York: Verson,
2006, 50-100.
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